




The Predictive Power of Subjective Probability Questions




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
de Bresser, J., & van Soest, A. (2017). The Predictive Power of Subjective Probability Questions. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2017-046). CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





























































This paper evaluates the predictive validity of stated intentions for actual behaviour.
In the context of the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election, we compare how well polls
based on probabilistic and deterministic questions line up with subsequent votes. Our
empirical strategy is built around a randomised experiment in a representative panel.
Respondents were either simply asked which party they will vote for, or were asked
to allocate probabilities of voting for each party. The results show that for the large
majority of the respondents, probabilities predict individual behaviour better than de-
terministic statements. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the predictive
power of the subjective probabilities. We find evidence that they work better for those
with higher probability numeracy, even though probability numeracy was measured
eight years earlier.
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1 Introduction
In inter-temporal models of economic behaviour, decisions are driven by expectations as well
as preferences. An individual’s decision to save, for instance, is driven not only by patience
or risk aversion but also by, e.g., the agent’s subjective distribution of future income or even
their survival probabilities. The fact that different combinations of preferences and beliefs
can rationalize the same observed behaviour has spurred interest in the direct measurement
of expectations in surveys (Manski, 2004). This literature has reached the conclusion that at
least from a theoretical point of view, the best way to elicit beliefs is to ask respondents to
report the probability that some future event will occur (see Manski, 2004). Such subjective
probabilities allow for straightforward measurement of uncertainty and are more comparable
across individuals than verbal qualitative statements (Manski, 2004). On the other hand,
however, reported probabilities have been found to be affected by non-classical measurement
error such as rounding (Manski and Molinari, 2010; Kleinjans and Van Soest, 2014). Many
studies have demonstrated that subjective probabilities also have empirical validity: they
correlate in plausible ways with background variables and help to predict future outcomes and
decisions (see, e.g., the overview in Hurd, 2009). Until now there has been no direct evidence
comparing the predictive power of subjective probabilities with that of the traditional way
of eliciting intentions through deterministic questions.
This paper analyses data from an experiment in which respondents were randomly al-
located to different types of questions that measure expectations regarding future decisions
(so-called choice expectations, Manski, 2004, or intentions). The expectations concern the
party an individual will vote for in the Dutch parliamentary elections of March 2017 and were
elicited approximately three months prior to the election. We compare intentions elicited by
deterministic items (“which party will you vote for?”) with probabilistic intentions (“what
is the probability that you will vote for party x?”). Since individuals do not face any restric-
tions on their actual voting behaviour, this is a clean case in which intentions and outcomes
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can be compared without the need to model or make assumptions on exogenous events that
may influence the actual outcome.
The idea of using subjective probabilities to elicit voting intentions goes back to Meier
and Campbell (1979), Meier (1980) and Maas et al. (1990), but none of these studies compare
probabilistic and deterministic approaches. Manski (2004) reports on a small pilot study for
the 2000 U.S. presidential election and large scale probabilistic polls have been carried out
for the presidential races of 2008, 2012 and 2016. Research on the latter two elections focused
on the extent to which probabilistic polls anticipated the actual aggregate election outcome.
Evidence has been mixed: it was one of the most accurate polls in 2012 (Gutsche et al.,
2014), but substantially over-predicted the Republicans’ share of the popular vote in 2016.
The analysis of the 2008 elections reported by Delavande and Manski (2010) is closest to the
present paper, because it considers the predictive power of verbal and probabilistic polling
questions at the level of the individual. The authors show that combining both types of items
improves the prediction of actual votes. However, doing so is costly, since it entails asking
two sets of questions to elicit voting intentions. Delavande and Manski (2010) acknowledge
that their research design, in which both probabilistic and verbal questions were posed in
quick succession to all respondents, does not allow them to evaluate which type of question
works best. After all, responses to the verbal questions may be affected by the probabilities
that respondents reported previously. Our empirical strategy avoids this problem, since it is
based on a large split-sample design.
Three features distinguish the present study from previous work. Firstly, we exploit a
randomised experiment in a large, representative household panel that allows us to compare
the predictive power of deterministic and probabilistic intentions in a clean way. In contrast
to the research described above, panel members were exclusively assigned to either type of
question. Secondly, while previous efforts focused on U.S. presidential races that effectively
amount to binary choices, we analyse the more fragmented setting of parliamentary elections
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in the Netherlands. On March 15 2017 the ballot listed 28 parties, 13 of which made it into
the parliament. Such profusion of options presumably makes probabilities more powerful,
since there is more scope for doubt experienced by undecided voters, particularly when the
election is still some time off (three months, in our case). Finally, our data come from a long
standing panel for which a lot of information has been collected in prior surveys. This allows
us to relate the predictive power of reported probabilities to relevant background information,
such as probability numeracy.
Our results, based on linear as well as multinomial discrete choice models, indicate that on
average and for the large majority of the population probabilistic questions are substantially
better predictors of actual votes than deterministic ones. Using linear models we find that
an increase in the reported probability of voting for a party from 0 to 100% increases the
likelihood of actually voting for that party by 46-79% in the deterministic sample, compared
to an increase of 70-97% in the probabilistic sample. We show that this added power of prob-
abilities can be attributed to the question format and not to systematic differences between
samples. While there is little variation in the predictive power of deterministic intentions,
estimates of a random coefficients discrete choice model point at substantial heterogeneity
in the predictive power of subjective probabilities. They work very well for a large majority
of the respondents (84%, according to our estimates), but perform worse than determinis-
tic statements for a small minority (16% of the sample). This heterogeneity is related to
probability numeracy: probabilities are better predictors for individuals with higher proba-
bility numeracy. This finding is in accordance with earlier studies demonstrating substantial
heterogeneity in individuals’ ability to work with probabilities and, in relation to that, the
value of their answers to subjective probability questions for predicting actual behaviour (see,
Armantier et al., 2015, and Binswanger and Salm, 2017).
In order to choose between a survey design with subjective probabilities or deterministic
intentions, a trade off should be made between the benefits and the costs. We therefore also
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briefly consider potential costs, due to the larger burden on the respondents. We find that
the survey with 14 subjective probabilities takes significantly longer than the same survey
with 14 deterministic intentions questions, with a difference at the median of slightly less
than 2 minutes. We find no significant difference between the two designs in respondent
evaluations of the difficulty or the attractiveness of the survey. We conclude that these
costs are dominated by the much larger predictive power of probabilities at the level of the
individual.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents some de-
scriptive statistics. Sections 3 and 4 contain our results regarding the predictive power of
deterministic and probabilistic intentions. We first estimate linear and non-linear models
that demonstrate that subjective probabilities provide additional power to predict each in-
dividual’s actual voting behaviour. Using one of our models, we then construct an index
for predictive power and relate it to probability numeracy. Section 5 briefly analyses the
additional respondent burden of subjective probability questions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The LISS panel
The LISS panel is a large household panel, consisting of approximately 8000 individuals in
5000 households that are broadly representative for the Dutch population (Van der Laan,
2009; De Vos, 2010).1 Households are selected randomly by Statistics Netherlands from the
complete registry of all Dutch non-institutionalized households. Surveys are administered
online, and selected households receive a simple computer and an Internet connection if they
do not have a computer or Internet access.
1More information on the panel, including code books for all available data and instructions on how to
obtain access, can be found on www.lissdata.nl.
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Longitudinal information on a wide range of socio-economic and demographic topics is
collected on a yearly basis in so-called “core” surveys. In addition, researchers can design
their own questionnaires on specific topics. Our analysis combines data from four different
surveys. The votes cast by respondents in the parliamentary elections of March 15 2017, our
main outcome variable, were collected in an “exit poll” during the two weeks immediately
following the election (between March 16th and 30th). Voting intentions for the same election
were collected in the core politics and values survey of December 2016, approximately three
months before the election.2 Background variables are obtained from the household box
of that month. Finally, in part of our analysis we use a “probability numeracy” variable
calculated from items included in a one-off disease prevention survey that was designed by
Katie Carman and Peter Kooreman and fielded in September of 2008 (see Bruine de Bruin and
Carman, 2012, and Carman and Kooreman, 2014). Unfortunately, a more recent numeracy
measure for the LISS respondents is not available.
2.2 Probabilistic poll
Crucially for this study, voting intentions were measured differently in 2016 compared to
previous years. Inspired by the probabilistic polls for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential
elections,3 an experiment was set up to compare responses to different types of polling ques-
tions. All respondents were asked to report their voting intentions in two steps. First, they
were all asked in the same way to indicate the probability that they would vote:
If parliamentary elections were held today, what is the percent chance that you will vote?
Please fill in a percentage between 0 and 100:
0..100
2Respondents were invited to take the survey early December. Those who did not take the survey in
December got another invitation in January 2017; only a small minority used this opportunity.
3See Gutsche et al. (2014), www.alpdata.rand.org/?page=election2012 and www.cesrusc.org/election/
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Second, respondents forecasted which party they would vote for conditional on voting.
One random half of the panel received a single deterministic question:
If parliamentary elections were held today, for which party would you vote?
[If Pr (vote) = 0: I would not vote], VVD (liberal party), . . ., VNL, Another party, Blank
This is the usual way voting intentions are measured in LISS. The answer options are the 14
parties represented in parliament at the time of the survey, any other party, and not casting
a vote on any of the parties (“Blank”). Respondents who gave a 0% probability of voting at
all in the previous question, got an additional option “I would not vote”.
The other half of the sample were asked to assign probabilities to voting for different
parties, voting “Blank”, or not voting at all:
If parliamentary elections were held today, what is the percent chance that you will vote
for each of the following parties? Total probability should add up to 100%.
[if Pr (vote) = 0: I would not vote], VVD (liberal party), . . ., VNL, Another party, Blank
In order to help respondents answer these questions in a logically consistent way, all parties
were shown on a single screen and the total probability mass that they had already distributed
was shown at the bottom. Respondents did not have to assign 15 (or 16) probabilities
explicitly: fields left empty were counted as zeros. Moreover, respondents could not proceed
to the next question in the survey if they provided probabilities outside the 0-100 interval or
if their probabilities did not add up to 100%.
The “treatment” deterministic or probability questions was assigned completely randomly.
As a consequence, the two treatment groups are similar in terms of observable characteristics
(see the balance tests reported in Appendix A).
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For our analysis, we compute the unconditional probabilities to vote for each party, com-
bining the (unconditional) probability of voting at all with the conditional probabilities of
voting for each of the parties given voting:
Pr (vote party x) = Pr (party x|vote)× Pr (vote) (1)
Moreover, “no vote” is added as the remaining possible outcome (with probability 1 −
Pr (vote)). These unconditional probabilities will be analysed in relation to the actual vot-
ing behaviour observed in the exit poll. As explained above, half of the respondents got
deterministic questions, restricting their probabilities Pr (party x|vote) to zero or one. On
the other hand, all respondents report their subjective probability to vote, Pr (vote), as a
probability. This implies that the unconditional probabilities can also take on values between
0% and 100%. We use the fact that there is no difference in elicitation method for “no vote”
as a placebo treatment, since there is no reason to expect any difference in the predictive
power of intentions across the two treatment groups for the “no vote” outcome.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Actual vote
The Dutch political landscape around the time of the 2017 parliamentary elections was highly
divided and voters could choose among 28 parties on the ballot. In addition, voters could
show up at a voting bureau but not cast a (valid) vote on any of the parties (the “blank”
option). At the time of our first survey (December 2016), the definitive list of parties on
the ballot was not yet known but the parties not yet represented in parliament were not
expected to attract many votes. In the survey we therefore only listed the 13 parties already
represented in parliament at that time (including two new parties started by members of
parliament who left their party during the term), as well as an option “other party”. In the
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Figure 1: The Dutch political landscape in March 2017 (source: presentation
by dr. André Krouwel, available here)
analysis, we combine the six smallest parties among these 13 with the original “other party”
and the “blank” option into a larger “other” category to generate a multinomial outcome
with nine options: “no vote” (or, to be more precise, no show up), a vote on one of the seven
largest political parties, and “other” (a vote on another party or a “blank” vote).
Figure 1 shows where the seven major parties are located in ideological space, following
the common two-dimensional party characterization of, e.g., Marks et al. (2006) and Van
Kersbergen and Krouwel (2008). The horizontal axis labeled left/right reflects the economic
dimension, expressing the distinction between egalitarian parties that favor extensive redis-
tribution and regulation (left) versus parties with a more laissez-faire ideology (right). The
vertical axis shows a non-economic dimension, with parties that favour cultural liberalism
and openness at the top (progressive, often labeled GAL (green, alternative and libertarian)),
and parties that favour restrictive immigration policies (conservative or TAN (traditional,
authoritarian, nationalist)) at the bottom. Hence, the economically liberal yet culturally
9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variable: actual vote in 2017 elections
a. Missing outcome (non-participation in exit poll)
Overall
Mean SD Deterministic Probabilistic Difference (SE)
Vote missing 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.08 -0.01 (0.008)
N 4349 2131 2218 4349
b. Dependent variable: actual vote in 2017 elections (0% or 100%)
Overall sample
Populationa Mean SD Deterministic Probabilistic Difference (SE)
VVD (liberal) 17.4 18.3 38.7 18.5 18.1 -0.4 (1.22)
Other party 14.1 13.9 34.6 13.8 14.1 0.3 (1.08)
CDA (christian) 10.1 13.4 34.1 13.7 13.2 -0.5 (1.09)
D66 (prog. lib.) 10.0 12.2 32.7 11.3 13.1 1.8* (1.03)
GL (green) 7.5 9.7 29.5 9.3 9.9 0.6 (0.94)
PVV (populist) 10.7 9.2 28.9 9.6 8.8 -0.8 (0.90)
SP (socialist) 7.4 9.1 28.8 9.2 9.0 -0.3 (0.89)
PvdA (labour) 4.7 7.1 25.7 6.8 7.4 0.6 (0.81)
No vote 18.1 7.1 25.7 7.7 6.5 -1.3 (0.82)
N 3978 1936 2042 3978
Chi-squared test for equality of vote distribution across treatments: χ2 (8) = 7.02, p-value = 0.54.
Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at household level (3275 clusters for missing DV model, 3027
clusters for DV). *p < 0.1
Notes
a Percent of the population that was eligible to vote (NOT a percentage of the vote).
conservative VVD can be found in the bottom right corner and the progressive leftists of
GroenLinks (Green Left, GL) in the top left. The Partij Voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party,
PVV) led by Geert Wilders was the most conservative party in the GAL/TAN dimension,
yet its economic ideas are middle-of-the-road.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of actual voting behaviour, as reported in the exit
poll in the two weeks after the elections. Panel a. shows that only 9% of panel members who
were eligible to vote and participated in the voting intentions survey in December 2016 did
not participate in the exit poll. This fraction is almost identical for both treatment groups.
Panel b. compares voting behaviour reported in our “exit poll” survey with voting behaviour
of the complete population. The liberal VVD received the largest share of the vote, 18.3% in
the sample and 17.4% in the population. The category “other party” got approximately 14%
of the votes, both in the sample and the population. While this large number may suggest
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splitting up the category “other” into its constituents, doing so would create outcomes that
are rarely chosen since this category is comprised of many rather small parties (and the
“blank” option).
The Christian democrat CDA is the second largest party in the sample at 13%, followed
by the progressively liberal D66 at just over 12% (with corresponding population figures
around 10% for both). The greens (GL) and the socialists (SP) received between 9 and 10%
of the votes in the panel, as did the populist PVV. While the greens and socialists did better
in the panel than in the population, the opposite is true for the PVV, which became the
second largest party with the support of 10.7% of the vote-eligible population. The smallest
individual party in our analysis is the labour party (PvdA), with 7% of the votes in the
sample and less than 5% in the population. With the exception of the PVV, the ranking
of parties is the same in the sample as in the population. On the other hand, there is a
large and salient difference between sample and population when it comes to the proportion
that did not vote at all: 18% in the population and only 7% in the sample. To put this
discrepancy of 11 percentage points (pp) in perspective, Delavande and Manski (2010) found
that for the presidential elections in 2008, turnout in the American Life Panel (ALP) was
28pp higher than in the complete population. We cannot say whether the high reported
turnout in the LISS is due to selection, an effect of panel participation on the likelihood of
voting, or simply misreporting. For our analysis this is not really relevant, since we compare
two randomised treatment groups within the LISS sample. A Chi-square test does not reject
the null hypothesis that the voting patterns (columns deterministic and probabilistic in the
table) are the same for the two groups with different treatments (p-value = 0.54).
Intentions
Figure 2 shows the distribution of reported probabilities for the “no vote”-option for those
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Figure 2: Histograms of probabilities for “no vote” excluding zeros
that received probabilistic and deterministic questions. Note that for “no vote” both samples
received the same, probabilistic, question, so we can use this probability for a placebo test on
systematic differences in accuracy of predictions across the two sub-samples that are not due
to different ways of eliciting expectations. Indeed, the two histograms look similar and we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions of “no vote” intentions are the
same: a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of the distributions yields a p-value of 0.85.
The histograms also show bunching of reported probabilities at multiples of 10 that is
common for data on subjective probabilities (cf., e.g., Manski and Molinari, 2010; Kleinjans
and Van Soest, 2014). There is some additional heaping at 50 percent, a value that has been
associated with focal answers not reflecting genuine uncertainty (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000).
This suggests that the observed degree of bunching can partly be explained by rounding, but
some of it may also be due to “epistemic” uncertainty – the inability to translate uncertainty
into meaningful probabilities. In our study we do not aim at isolating rounding errors or
focal answers. We take the reported probabilities at face value and analyse how well they
predict actual behaviour.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of voting intentions. It presents the overall means,
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of intentions: stated intention to vote
(three months before the election; 0-100%)
Deterministic Probabilistic
Fraction equal to Fraction equal to
Mean 0 1-99 100 Mean 0 1-99 100
VVD (liberal) 13.7 0.85 0.04 0.10 13.7 0.67 0.29 0.04
Other party 18.1 0.78 0.09 0.12 14.6 0.60 0.36 0.04
CDA (christian) 7.9 0.92 0.02 0.06 9.4 0.72 0.25 0.03
D66 (prog. lib.) 9.1 0.90 0.03 0.07 11.1 0.65 0.34 0.02
GL (green) 7.1 0.92 0.03 0.05 8.0 0.73 0.26 0.02
PVV (populist) 13.9 0.84 0.06 0.10 11.5 0.75 0.20 0.05
SP (socialist) 6.5 0.93 0.03 0.04 7.4 0.75 0.23 0.02
PvdA (labour) 6.4 0.93 0.03 0.04 8.3 0.72 0.26 0.02
No vote 17.2 0.59 0.33 0.07 16.1 0.58 0.34 0.07
N 1936 2042
as well as means and other summary statistics for the sub-samples that received probabilistic
and deterministic questions. In the sub-sample that faced a deterministic choice between
parties, only 2-9% of the probabilities are not equal to either 0 or 100 percent. This is because
all respondents in this treatment who report a 0 or 100 percent probability of not voting at
all, automatically get probability 100 or 0 for each party. In contrast, the probabilistic sub-
sample exhibits substantial variation across political parties in the fraction of intermediate
probabilities. Only 20% doubt between voting for the populist PVV and some other option,
while 34% considers voting for the progressive liberals of D66 but is not certain yet.
Histograms of reported intentions to vote for the three most prevalent options are pre-
sented in Figure 3. We limit the sample to respondents who received probabilistic questions
and reported a strictly positive probability. Bunching at multiples of 10 is evident for all
options. There is also some bunching at other values (e.g., 18, 45) that is due to the fact that
the probabilities in this figure are computed as the product of the probability to vote and
the conditional probability to vote for a given party, which both have their own bunching














0 20 40 60 80 100
Intention (%)
a. VVD (liberals)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Intention (%)
b. Other party
0 20 40 60 80 100
Intention (%)
c. CDA (christian democrats)
Figure 3: Histograms of probabilities for three most prevalent options ex-
cluding zeros (probabilistic sub-sample)
could be due to epistemic uncertainty, as in Figure 2.
For respondents in the probabilistic subsample, we can define the “consideration set” as
the set of parties to which a respondent assigns a positive probability. Figure 4 summa-
rizes the size of the consideration sets of respondents in the probabilistic sample for those
individuals who report a positive probability that they will vote (93% of the sample).4 At
approximately three months before the election, only 30% of respondents have already fully
made up their mind (100% for one specific option). About 47% doubt between two or three
options and 11% spread their probability mass over four. All in all, panel members use the
flexibility of the probabilistic questions to express a plausible level of uncertainty.
In order to facilitate comparing intentions with actual votes in the aggregate, Figure 5
combines the overall actual and intended vote shares for all alternatives. Actual votes are on
the vertical and intentions on the horizontal axis. If predicted and actual vote shares were
exactly equal, all circles would lie on the 45 degree line. This is apparently not the case. The
probabilistic expectations (solid circles) are closer to the diagonal than the deterministic ex-
pectations (hollow circles) in 7 out of 9 cases. Moreover, the differences are significant at the
4The “no vote” option is not counted here, and non-zero probabilities for more than one party in the
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Figure 4: Distribution of size of consideration set: the number of parties to
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Solid circles: probabilistic intentions. Hollow circles: deterministic intentions.
No overlap with solid line: difference is significant at 10%.
Figure 5: Aggregate intentions and actual votes
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10% level for 4 of the 7 options for which probabilities outperform deterministic statements.
(The remaining cases are VVD for which probabilistic and deterministic aggregates are al-
most the same, and PvdA where both are on different sides of the 45 degree line, with the
deterministic aggregate somewhat closer to it than the probabilistic forecast.) This suggests
that the probabilities give better predictors of aggregate behaviour than the deterministic
answers.
The focus of our paper, however, is not the aggregate level but the predictive power of
subjective probabilities at the individual level. Figure 6 provides a first impression of the
relationships between intentions and actual votes. The graphs present kernel regressions of
an indicator for choosing each alternative on the reported probabilities. In the first “no
vote” graph, there are separate regressions for the two treatments, but this is hard to see
since the lines and confidence bands overlap. This is reassuring, since the intention not to
vote was elicited by the same question in both samples. The fitted lines lie substantially
below the diagonal: respondents underestimate the probability they will vote at all levels of
stated expectations. The fraction of people who abstain from voting is below 20% all the
way up to a reported intention around 0.8. The rate of non-voters rises among those who
report being nearly certain they will not vote, but never beyond 50%. This is not due to
smoothing: among those who reported complete certainty that they will not vote, 47% do
participate in the ballot. We can interpret this as a macro-effect: events and developments
between December 2016 and March 2017 (or even the weather on the day of the elections)
have stimulated interest in the elections and have increased voting rates across the board.
For the other outcomes, similar kernel regressions are performed for the probabilistic
sample only. We visualize the relationship differently for the deterministic treatment, because
of the scarcity of probabilities unequal to either zero or one. For this subsample, the plots




























































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Intention (pr.)
Other party
Figure 6: Kernel regressions of actual vote on voting intention (bandwidth
12pp)
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falls in one of the three categories included in Table 2: zero, one, or some probability in-
between (which we anchor on the average probability between 0.01 and 0.99 in the figure).
In both subsamples, intentions appear to be better predictors of voting for a specific party
than of the decision not to vote. The probabilistic questions show a clear S-shaped pattern
that is similar for all parties: the likelihood of voting for a party is close to zero for intentions
below 0.2, then increases almost linearly to around 80% for intentions around 0.8, and then
levels off. Intermediate levels of intentions understate the likelihood of voting for the liberal
VVD, the largest party in our sample (60% of those who report a 50/50 chance of voting VVD
end up doing so). The opposite applies to the populist PVV and the “other” option (only
30% of those who predict a 50/50 chance chose those options). The voting behaviour of the
deterministic and probabilistic sub-samples is similar for low levels of intentions: if someone
in the probabilistic sample assigned a very low probability to a given party, the chances that
he or she voted for that party are very low. Similarly, if someone in the deterministic sample
intended not to vote for a specific party, the chances he or she voted for that party are equally
low. On the other hand, there is a notable difference between the two samples at the other
end of the intentions range. Among those in the probabilistic sample with probability close
to one to vote for a specific party, the fraction who indeed voted for that party is typically
larger than the same fraction among those the deterministic group who intended to vote for
that same party. This is especially true for the PVV and the “other” parties, for which only
60% and 50% voted for the party they indicated, respectively.
3 Regression models
3.1 Linear models
We first present estimates of separate linear probability models for each of the nine actual
voting outcomes; see Table 3. Panel a. contains our baseline estimates, using all the data
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Table 3: Linear probability models of actual vote (0% or 100%)
a. Baseline (no controls included in the models)
Parties
no vote VVD PVV CDA D66 GL SP PvdA other
Intention (%) 0.428*** 0.791*** 0.572*** 0.782*** 0.658*** 0.680*** 0.586*** 0.686*** 0.456***
(0.0319) (0.0243) (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0369) (0.0412) (0.0452) (0.0411) (0.0299)
Intention × prob. questions -0.0349 0.180*** 0.127*** 0.176*** 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.163*** 0.266***
(0.0446) (0.0387) (0.0470) (0.0483) (0.0567) (0.0609) (0.0667) (0.0593) (0.0434)
Prob. questions -0.232 -2.863*** -0.852* -3.370*** -1.937** -1.724** -2.399*** -1.995*** -2.021**
(0.539) (0.871) (0.464) (0.813) (0.782) (0.681) (0.713) (0.503) (0.796)
Constant 0.365 7.673*** 1.641*** 7.524*** 5.255*** 4.516*** 5.453*** 2.346*** 5.552***
(0.403) (0.684) (0.337) (0.655) (0.543) (0.495) (0.585) (0.370) (0.592)
N 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978
R-squared overall 0.24 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.26 0.43 0.27
R-squared deterministic 0.25 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.24
R-squared probabilistic 0.23 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.44 0.31
b. Probabilistic intentions replaced by mode (no controls included in the models)
Parties
no vote VVD PVV CDA D66 GL SP PvdA other
Intention (%) 0.428*** 0.791*** 0.572*** 0.782*** 0.658*** 0.680*** 0.586*** 0.686*** 0.456***
(0.0319) (0.0243) (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0369) (0.0412) (0.0452) (0.0411) (0.0299)
Intention × prob. questions -0.0349 -0.0145 0.0411 -0.000952 -0.00733 0.0475 0.0448 -0.00548 0.151***
(0.0446) (0.0353) (0.0453) (0.0443) (0.0500) (0.0545) (0.0622) (0.0556) (0.0420)
Prob. questions -0.232 -1.019 -0.121 -1.866** 0.546 -0.271 -1.044 -0.564 0.524
(0.539) (0.901) (0.451) (0.828) (0.781) (0.685) (0.714) (0.498) (0.799)
Constant 0.365 7.673*** 1.641*** 7.524*** 5.255*** 4.516*** 5.453*** 2.346*** 5.552***
(0.403) (0.684) (0.337) (0.655) (0.543) (0.495) (0.585) (0.370) (0.592)
N 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978 3978
R-squared overall 0.24 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.27
R-squared deterministic 0.25 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.24
R-squared probabilistic 0.23 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.44 0.29
Systems of linear probability models are estimated as SUR models (allowing for dependence between error terms of different equations).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level (3027 clusters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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available for the two sub-samples. The leftmost column corresponds to the “no vote” out-
come. In line with the kernel regressions in Figure 6, the predicted probability of not voting
increases from close to 0% for a reported intention of zero percent to 43% for an intention
equal to 100%. The fact that the intention not to vote does not predict that outcome well
is also apparent in the low R-squared of 0.24. Importantly, the intercept and the slope of
this relationship do not differ significantly between the probabilistic and the deterministic
samples (neither jointly, nor individually). This is in line with what we would expect since
no-voting intentions are asked in the same way in the two sub-samples. Hence the placebo
test is passed.
For the political parties, intentions are more predictive of behaviour than for the “no vote”
option and there is added value for probabilistic questions relative to deterministic ones. For
example, in the deterministic sample the predicted probability of voting for VVD increases
from 8% for someone announcing not to vote for VVD to 87% for someone announcing he
or she will vote VVD. In the probabilistic sample the intercept is almost 3pp lower and
the slope 18pp steeper (the coefficient on the interaction Intention × prob. questions),
so the corresponding increase is from 5% for someone with intention 0% to vote VVD to
approximately 100% for someone with intention 100% to vote VVD. Furthermore, the R-
squared is 0.47, approximately twice that for “no vote”. While the predictability of the
vote varies across parties, the general pattern described for VVD is found for all parties.
In the deterministic sample the predicted probability of voting increases substantially if
someone intends to vote for that party, from between 1.6 and 7.7% to between 51 and
87%. For the probabilistic sample, the intercept is always significantly smaller and the
slope is always significantly steeper, and the predictions rise from between 0.35 and 4.9% for
someone with intention 0% to vote for that party to between 71% and 100% at intention
100%. Deterministic intentions do worst for the “other party” outcome, but probabilistic
intentions work much better here. Probabilistic intentions do worst (and have the lowest
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added value) for the populist PVV. Still, even for this party, the subjective probabilities
have significantly larger predictive power than the deterministic statements.
Panel b. of Table 3 presents estimates for the same regression models but with the prob-
abilistic intentions transformed to match intentions elicited in the deterministic treatment.
Since both samples received the same question for “no vote” we did not adjust those inten-
tions and the estimates are identical to those reported in panel a. For the parties, we replace
the conditional probabilities for the probabilistic sample by 100% for a unique mode, splitting
probability mass evenly in case of multiple modes (which occurs for 15% of the observations),
and 0% for the other options. The results show that this discretisation of probabilistic inten-
tions largely removes their added value for prediction relative to the deterministic questions.
The differences in slopes (i.e., the coefficients on the interactions) are reduced to close to
zero and insignificant for all parties except “other” (for which the difference is almost halved
to 15pp but remains significant). This demonstrates that the additional predictive power of
subjective probabilities is almost completely due to the more detailed information that these
probabilities provide. If this information is largely removed (largely because in the multiple
modes case, the transformed probabilities are still more informative than the deterministic
intentions), the additional predictive power is lost almost completely.
The models presented in Table 3 do not contain any other covariates, and thus rely on
the randomisation to ensure that probabilistic and deterministic samples are comparable.
Appendix C contains estimates of similar linear models that control for a wide range of
covariates. The estimates of the slopes of probabilistic and deterministic intentions are
virtually identical to those in Table 3. Moreover, the R-squared increases only slightly (never
by more than 3pp), indicating that covariates such as gender, age and education have little
explanatory power once we control for intentions.
Summarizing, we find clear evidence that subjective probabilities are much better in
predicting individual behaviour than deterministic intentions. This added value is a con-
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sequence of the finer response scale which provides additional information, and disappears
when probabilities are transformed into modes. In the next section we turn to multinomial
discrete choice models and investigate how the predictive power of subjective probabilities
varies across individuals.
3.2 Multinomial choice models
Multinomial choice models account for the binary and joint nature of the nine actual voting
outcomes. Table 4 contains estimates of two models. The first (panel a.) is a standard
multinomial logit model with fixed coefficients. It contains alternative-specific constants
and their interactions with the dummy for the probabilistic sample. Moreover, interactions
with deterministic and probabilistic intentions are added, allowing the predictive power of
deterministic intentions and the added value of probabilistic intentions to vary across parties
(as in the linear models reported in Table 3). The estimates tell a similar story as the
linear models. Firstly, the intention not to vote significantly predicts not voting and carries
the same predictive power in both subsamples, as expected (the placebo test). Second and
more importantly, for all political parties except one (PVV), intentions collected by means
of probabilistic questions have significantly larger predictive power than the deterministic
ones: the coefficients on the interactions between reported intentions and the probabilistic
treatment dummy are always positive, and significant in all cases except PVV.
One way to increase the flexibility of the multinomial logit model and allow for hetero-
geneous treatment effects is to model key parameters as random coefficients. In order to
keep the number of random coefficients manageable, we assume that in both subsamples, the
effects of intentions are the same for all parties (but not for “no vote”, for which the treat-
ment is a placebo treatment). We estimate a random coefficients version of the multinomial
logit model (often called mixed logit model) with two random coefficients: the coefficient on
intentions and the coefficient on the interaction of intentions with the subjective probabilities
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Table 4: Multinomial choice models of actual vote
a. Fixed coefficients
Alternatives
Intentions VVD PVV CDA D66 GL SP PvdA other
Intention (%) 0.0297***
(0.00251)
Intention × prob. questions -0.00264
(0.00366)
Intention × party 0.00456 0.00540 0.00356 -0.00100 0.00146 -0.00483 0.00798** -0.0118***
(0.00330) (0.00333) (0.00373) (0.00336) (0.00355) (0.00347) (0.00355) (0.00309)
Intention × prob. × party 0.0186*** 0.00833* 0.0196*** 0.0184*** 0.0203*** 0.0177*** 0.0198*** 0.0155***
(0.00551) (0.00498) (0.00636) (0.00578) (0.00643) (0.00592) (0.00655) (0.00482)
Prob. questions -0.192 0.181 -0.273 0.0383 -0.0164 -0.178 -0.0969 -0.0268
(0.295) (0.345) (0.302) (0.307) (0.313) (0.306) (0.342) (0.304)
Constant 1.286*** -0.0441 1.308*** 0.982*** 0.830*** 1.046*** 0.197 1.182***




b. Mixed logit – independent normal mixing distributions
Alternatives




Intention × prob. questions 0.0266***
(0.00289)
Intention × no vote -0.00136
(0.00340)
Intention × prob. quest. × no vote -0.0345***
(0.00605)
Prob. quest. × no vote 0.247
(0.271)
Constant -1.354*** -1.235*** -0.0540 -0.334*** -0.448*** -0.449*** -0.949*** -0.651***
(0.190) (0.111) (0.0761) (0.0791) (0.0840) (0.0845) (0.0997) (0.0832)
Standard deviations of parameters
Intention (%) 0.00856
(0.00551)





The dependent variable distinguishes between: no vote; VVD; PVV; CDA; D66; GL; SP; PvdA; other.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level (3027 clusters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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treatment. In this way, we allow the predictive power of intentions in both subsamples to
vary across respondents in a parsimonious way. (We also experimented with models with
more random coefficients, but did not find substantial heterogeneity in other coefficients;
estimates are available on request.)
Panel b. of Table 4 presents the estimates for independent normal distributions of the two
random coefficients. The mean predictive power of deterministic intentions is similar to that
estimated in the fixed coefficients model of Table 4a. and the associated standard deviation
is small in size and not significantly different from zero. Hence, the model does not indicate
substantial heterogeneity in the predictive power of deterministic intentions. The positive
and significant mean coefficient on the interaction intention × prob. questions shows that
on average, probabilistic intentions outperform deterministic ones. Moreover, the estimated
standard deviation is significant as well and almost equally large as the mean, implying
that for about 84% (Φ(0.0266/0.0266)) of all respondents, the probability questions indeed
provide additional power for predicting whether someone voted for a specific party. In the
next subsection, we will analyse how this heterogeneity in the additional predictive power of
subjective probabilities relates to characteristics of the individual. Probabilistic intentions
have no additional predictive power for the “no vote” option, the placebo: the coefficient on
the interaction intention × prob. quest. × no vote is negative and significant, cancelling the
difference found for the other alternatives.
In order to facilitate interpretation of the magnitudes of the coefficients in Table 4, we
report average marginal effects in Table 5. These are calculated as the average increase in the
probability of voting for a given party that results from a 100pp increase in the intention to
vote for that party. For each party we compare the situation in which the individual assigns a
probability of zero to vote for this party and 1/8 to each other option with that in which (s)he
assigns 100% to this party and zero to the other options. Table 5a uses the MNL estimates of
Table 4a, allowing the predictive power of deterministic intentions and probabilities to vary
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Table 5: Sample average marginal effect of 100pp increase in intent on probability of voting consistently
Model 5a Model 5b
100pp increase in intent to vote... Deter. Prob. Diff. (pp)a Diff. (%)b Deter. Prob. Diff. (pp)a Diff. (%)b
... VVD (liberal) 0.74 0.87 13 18 0.66 0.79 13 20
... other party 0.41 0.71 30 73 0.60 0.80 20 33
... CDA (christian) 0.73 0.87 14 19 0.66 0.79 13 20
... D66 (prog. lib.) 0.62 0.85 23 37 0.64 0.80 16 25
... GL (green) 0.65 0.87 22 34 0.62 0.80 18 29
... PVV (populist) 0.58 0.75 17 29 0.50 0.77 27 54
... SP (socialist) 0.55 0.81 26 47 0.62 0.80 18 29
... PvdA (labour) 0.68 0.90 22 32 0.55 0.79 24 44
... no vote 0.45 0.41 -4 -9 0.45 0.39 -6 -13
Example: for the first alternative intentions change from (0, 1/8, 1/8, ..., 1/8) to (1, 0, 0, ..., 0).
Notes
a Difference probabilistic− deterministic.
b Percentage difference (prob. − deter.)/deter.× 100.
across the nine alternatives. The marginal effect of deterministic intentions is weakest for
“other party” and strongest for the liberal VVD. Probabilities add 22-30pp for D66, GL, SP
and “other party”. These estimates corroborate the insights from the linear models reported
above. The average marginal effects according to the mixed logit model in Table 5b are
qualitatively similar and lead to the same overall conclusion, though the magnitudes of the
differences between the two sub-samples are sometimes rather different.
4 Heterogeneity in the predictive power of probabili-
ties
The mixed logit with normal mixing distributions presented in Table 4b can be used to back
out estimates of the two individual specific parameters for each respondent. These individual
specific estimates are the posterior means of the random coefficients, conditional on the
individual’s reported intentions and actual voting outcome. We are especially interested in
the individual-specific parameter on the interaction intention × prob. quest. for the sample
that received probabilistic questions, since this parameter provides a measure of the predictive
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Figure 7: Kernel densities of random coefficients in mixed logit model 5b
power of subjective probabilities at the level of the individual.
The posterior means are proxies of the individual-specific parameters. There are two
reasons why they are not identical to them. Firstly, the posterior means are calculated from
the estimates reported in Table 4b and the estimation uncertainty of the mixed logit carries
through in subsequent analysis. The online appendix analyses this source of estimation
uncertainty in the individual-level parameters and explains how it can be accounted for.
Estimation uncertainty of the mixed logit would disappear if the number of respondents
tends to infinity. However, this still leaves the second issue: we only observe a single decision
(the actual vote in the election) for each respondent. For any given individual the estimated
posterior mean would be a consistent estimate of their parameter only if the number of
observed choices would tend to infinity. In the analysis below, we just use the proxies (the
posterior means) at face value and do not try to analyse their deviations from the individual
specific parameters.
Figure 7 plots the densities of the posterior means for all respondents. Panel a. shows the
distribution of the posterior means of the main effect of intentions and of the interaction of
intentions and the probabilistic treatment dummy. We limit the sample to the relevant sub-
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sample in both cases: respondents who received the deterministic questions for the main effect
and respondents who received the probabilistic treatment for the interaction. As was evident
from the estimates in Table 4b, there is little heterogeneity in the effect of deterministic
intentions but substantial variation in the interaction term. The added value of probabilities
thus varies across respondents: the density peaks for a coefficient just under 0.04 and it has
a heavy left tail. The variation in coefficients indicates that the combination of a single set
of intentions and a single vote already provides substantial information on the individual
specific coefficients beyond the marginal information in the mixing distribution.
Panel b. of Figure 7 displays densities for the interaction term separately by the political
party individuals voted for. It shows that the predominant feature of the overall density, the
heavy left tail, is evident for the constituents of each party. The online appendix analyses
estimation error in the posterior means. The results reported there indicate that sampling
error in coefficients that results from using estimates of the mixed logit is substantial relative
to the cross-sectional variation in the point estimates of posterior means. All estimates (and
standard errors) reported below take this uncertainty into account.
Though the general shape of the distribution is similar for voters of all parties, the lo-
cations differ. For instance, Figure 7b shows that the distribution for respondents who did
not vote lies slightly to the right of the other ones. Importantly, such variation in the pos-
terior means of voters who choose different alternatives reflects features of the amount of
information carried by the actual vote and the reported intentions in addition to variation
in the extent to which intentions are consistent with actual decisions. For a given set of
stated intentions, such as a 100% probability on the party that the individual actually voted
for, there is significant variation in posterior means across parties. Therefore, we control for
the party someone voted for in some specifications of the model discussed below, where the
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Figure 8: Kernel regressions of the predictive power of probabilistic intentions
on probability numeracy (shaded areas are 95% confidence bands)
4.1 Probability numeracy and the predictive power of subjective
probabilities
We construct a measure of probability numeracy from the 9-item scale that was administered
as part of the 2008 disease prevention survey in the LISS panel. Appendix D contains a list
of these items as well as the estimates of the item-response model used to aggregate them
into a single measure for each individual. Unfortunately, we can only construct a numeracy
score for half of our sample due to panel refreshments between 2008 and 2017.
Appendix E displays estimates of linear models that relate probability numeracy to back-
ground characteristics and actual voting behaviour. Probability numeracy varies significantly
with voting behaviour: respondents who abstain from voting have the lowest average numer-
acy, followed by the socialists (SP) and populists (PVV). The other constituencies all have
higher numeracy. Though education also clearly matters, with the higher educated displaying
better numeracy, significant and substantial differences across parties remain if education is
controlled for (see the second column of the table).
Figure 8 shows kernel regressions of the posterior means that measure the predictive
power of subjective probabilities, the coefficients on intention × prob. questions multiplied
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by 100, on probability numeracy. We find that the two are positively related and that
this association becomes more pronounced when we control for demographics and for the
party that an individual voted for.5 The association is non-linear: at low levels of numeracy
increases are associated with a tighter link between choice expectations and actual behaviour
while the relationship flattens out for middle levels of numeracy and picks up again for those
at the top end of the numeracy distribution.
Table 6 contains estimates of linear regression models of individual-level posterior means
on numeracy, education and other controls (not reported). Numeracy enters the model
linearly and is not transformed by taking the log, because it takes both positive and negative
values. The estimates provide strong evidence that probability numeracy correlates positively
with the extent to which probabilities predict voting. The association between numeracy and
the predictive power of probabilities becomes stronger when controlling for education and
the party one voted for. The strong link between numeracy and the predictive power of
probabilities is especially striking in light of the eight year period between the elicitation
of numeracy and the collection of voting data. Several robustness checks corroborate this
significantly positive correlation between the predictive power of probabilities and probability
numeracy, using both normal and log-normal mixing distributions and models with more
random coefficients (on intention × no vote and intention × prob. quest. × no vote; results
available upon request).
5Controlling for other covariates is achieved by first regressing probability numeracy on the other covariates
and then performing the kernel regression of the posterior mean on the residual of the first regression rather
than probability numeracy itself.
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Table 6: Models of mixed logit interaction coefficients
Dependent variable: mixed logit coef. × 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prob. numeracy 0.0753 0.125** 0.125** 0.154***
(-0.0284; 0.197) (0.000; 0.280) (0.0198; 0.255) (0.0308; 0.314)
Education (baseline: primary)
Inter. secondary -0.0364 -0.00202
(-0.446; 0.355) (-0.376; 0.377)
Higher secondary -0.0559 0.0635
(-0.540; 0.399) (-0.387; 0.529)
Inter. vocational -0.0473 0.0315
(-0.466; 0.365) (-0.349; 0.441)
Higher vocational 0.0188 0.102
(-0.386; 0.429) (-0.283; 0.519)
University 0.208 0.275
(-0.260; 0.716) (-0.167; 0.793)
Actual vote (baseline: no vote)
VVD -1.295*** -1.279***
(-2.139; -0.579) (-2.150; -0.521)
Other party -1.046*** -1.151***
(-1.796; -0.387) (-2.017; -0.427)
CDA -1.435*** -1.484***
(-2.307; -0.677) (-2.447; -0.664)
D66 -1.281*** -1.309***
(-2.124; -0.548) (-2.245; -0.530)
GL -1.303*** -1.405***
(-2.162; -0.551) (-2.359; -0.596)
SP -1.550*** -1.581***
(-2.491; -0.733) (-2.622; -0.634)
PVV -0.837*** -0.882***
(-1.580; -0.204) (-1.680; -0.207)
PvdA -0.968*** -0.853
(-1.738; -0.317) (-1.934; 3.660)
Controls No Yesa No Yesa
Observations 1002 1002 1002 1002
R-squared 0.0036 0.062 0.086 0.14
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Confidence intervals and p-values take into account estimation error in the dependent
variable (see online appendix).
Notes
a Specification controls for gender, age, net HH income, HH type (single; partner no chil-
dren; partner with children; single with children; other), homeownership, urbanization,
ethnicity (Dutch, 1st gen Western, 1st gen non-Western, 2nd gen Western, 2nd gen non-
Western) and a full set of dummies for the party the respondent voted for.
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5 Completion time and survey evaluation
In order to judge whether the additional predictive power of subjective probability questions
makes incorporating them in the survey worthwhile, it seems useful to also consider the
costs in terms of higher respondent burden. Each data set collected in the LISS panel
includes variables that measure the time a respondent spent answering the questions, which
can be seen as an approximation of the effort panel members put into their answers. In
Table 7, we compare the time taken to complete the survey across the samples that received
probabilistic and deterministic questions. Panel a. presents some percentiles (which are less
sensitive to outliers than means and standard deviations), showing that a large majority of
the respondents spend between 10 and 45 minutes on completing the survey, with a median
slightly over 15 minutes. Interestingly, the percentiles are higher for the probabilistic than
for the deterministic sample. Using quantile regressions, panel b. of Table 7 confirms that
these differences are statistically significant and do not change much if we control for a wide
range of demographics (as expected due to randomly assigned treatment). The probabilistic
questions caused respondents to take 1 minute longer at the first quartile, 2 minutes at the
median and 3 minutes at the third quartile. Apparently, respondents tend to put in more
effort to report probabilities than they do to select a single party.
At the end of each survey, LISS routinely asks some diagnostic questions about the
perceived difficulty and the extent to which respondents enjoyed filling out the questionnaire.
We compared the answers across treatments, but did not find any significant differences
between the two treatments; see Appendix B for details.6 We can therefore conclude that
even though the subjective probabilities required some additional effort, the respondents did
not find the probabilistic survey substantially more difficult, less interesting, or less enjoyable
than the deterministic one.
6This result might be due to the order of the questions; voting intentions (the only difference between the
treatments) were located 55th and 56th among 170 items.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics and regression models of time to com-
plete survey
a. Descriptive statistics of time (min.) to complete survey
Percentiles
N p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Deterministic 1933 9.7 12.2 16.2 22.8 38.2
Probabilistic 2037 10.3 13.3 17.6 25.1 46.4
b. Quantile regressions of time (min.) to complete surveya
Quantile regressions
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Prob. questions 0.72*** 1.05*** 1.81*** 2.70*** 7.31*
(0.214) (0.218) (0.271) (0.495) (4.243)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3725 3725 3725 3725 3725
Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at household level (2867 clus-
ters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Notes
a Specification controls for gender, age, education, net HH income, HH type
(single; partner no children; partner with children; single with children;
other), homeownership, urbanization and ethnicity (Dutch, 1st gen West-
ern, 1st gen non-Western, 2nd gen Western, 2nd gen non-Western).
6 Conclusion
This paper looks at the predictive power of subjective probability questions in surveys that
elicit how the same survey respondents intend to behave in the future. In particular, we use
the context of parliamentary elections in the Netherlands to relate individuals’ intentions
to vote for different parties, elicited three months before the election, to how they actually
voted. We exploit experimental variation in the question format used to measure intentions
and compare deterministic items, in which respondents choose a single party as their best pre-
diction, with probabilistic questions that allow individuals to express uncertainty and doubt.
Such a probabilistic approach to polling has been applied to U.S. presidential elections since
2008, but we are the first to compare the predictive power of probabilistic and deterministic
intentions using a large split-sample design. Moreover, while U.S. elections are contests be-
tween two parties, the Dutch elections ask voters to choose between many more options. Our
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outcome variable distinguishes between nine possibilities: the seven major parties, the option
to vote for any other party or to vote “blank”, and the option not to vote at all. The multi-
party nature of the Dutch political system creates scope for using probabilities to express
undecidedness and indeed, 70% of the respondents assign positive probabilities to more than
one party. On average, they assign positive probabilities to 2.6 parties. Such information is
not contained in deterministic voting intentions, and our main research question is whether
(and if so, for which respondents) it has added value for predicting individual behaviour.
Probabilistic questions may require more effort from respondents: at the median those
who answered them took almost two minutes longer to complete the survey than respondents
who were asked to choose a single party did. Nonetheless, both formats yield similar rates of
item non-response and there are no significant differences between the two treatments in the
evaluations of the difficulty or attractiveness of the survey. Comparing average intentions and
actual votes at the aggregate level, we find that probabilities are closer to realized behaviour
for 7 out of 9 options and the difference between question formats is significant for 4 of these.
Our main finding is that at the level of the individual, subjective probabilities are sub-
stantially better predictors of actual voting than deterministic intentions. This follows from
non-parametric regressions as well as linear and non-linear regression models. In linear mod-
els, an increase from 0 to 100% in the deterministic intention to vote for a given party
is associated with a 70pp increase in the likelihood of voting for that party. Probabilistic
questions add another 20pp. Similarly, in multinomial logit and mixed logit models, the
estimated average marginal effect of a probabilistic prediction is between 18 and 47 percent
higher than that of a deterministic question for the same party. These benefits of probabili-
ties over deterministic answers are largely due to the additional information contained in the
probabilities: if probabilities are first discretized to resemble the deterministic answers (the
party with the largest probability), their predictive performance is very similar to (and not
significantly different from) that of the deterministic questions.
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We use the estimates of a mixed logit model to approximate the predictive power of
probabilistic intentions for each individual in the sub-sample that received those questions.
Using normal mixing distributions we find that subjective probabilities provide additional
predictive power for actual behaviour for a large majority (84%) of the respondents. There
is a significantly positive association between the extent to which probabilities add to the
predictive power and probability numeracy as measured using a 9-item scale. This must be
a very persistent relation, since the measure of probability numeracy is constructed based
on data from 2008 while the poll data was collected more than eight years later. The result
is in line with earlier studies demonstrating heterogeneity in the ability to work with prob-
abilities and their predictive value. On the other hand, we find that the predictive power of
deterministic intentions hardly varies across the sample.
Comparing benefits and costs, our main overall conclusion is that subjective probabilities
should be preferred over deterministic questions when one aims to predict behaviour at the
level of the individual. They work well when predicting choices from a discrete menu of
options. Future research can investigate whether the benefits observed for the application of
voting extend to other domains.
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Appendix A: balance tests
Table A1: Balance tests: descriptive statistics of covariates by question type
Overall
N Mean SD Deterministic Probabilistic Difference (SE)
Female 3978 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 -0.01 (0.016)
HH members 3978 2.4 1.3 2.4 2.5 0.07* (0.039)
Partner 3978 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.72 0.03* (0.015)
Age 3978 54 17 54 54 -0.1 (0.54)
Net HH income 3882 3108 3574 3148 3070 -78 (116.0)
Homeowner 3938 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.73 -0.01 (0.014)
Prob. numeracya 2033 0.00 0.84 -0.04 0.04 0.07* (0.038)
Education
Primary 3974 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.06 -0.01 (0.007)
Inter. secondary 3974 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.21 -0.02* (0.013)
Higher secondary 3974 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.12 0.02** (0.010)
Inter. vocational 3974 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.23 -0.02 (0.014)
Higher vocational 3974 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.26 0.02 (0.014)
University 3974 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.12 0.01 (0.010)
Ethnicity
Dutch 3872 0.87 0.34 0.86 0.88 0.02** (0.011)
First gen. Western 3872 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.03 -0.001 (0.005)
First gen. non-Western 3872 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.03 -0.002 (0.006)
Sec. gen. Western 3872 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.05 -0.007 (0.007)
Sec. gen. non-Western 3872 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.01 -0.01*** (0.004)
Urbanisation
Extremely 3974 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.14 -0.006 (0.011)
Very 3974 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.26 0.004 (0.014)
Moderately 3974 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.21 -0.02 (0.013)
Slightly 3974 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.22 0.003 (0.013)
Rural 3974 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.17 0.02* (0.012)
Reported statistical significance is not corrected for multiple comparisons. No single null-hypothesis
is rejected if we correct the initial p-cutoff of 0.05 for multiple comparisons using the methods
proposed by Holland and Copenhaver (1987); by Benjamini and Liu (1999) and Sarkar (2002); or by
Simes (1986), Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001). Only a single
null-hypothesis is rejected using these methods for an initial p-cutoff of 0.10, corresponding to second
generation non-Western migrants. Balance checks correcting for multiple comparisons are available
on request.
Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at household level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Notes
a Computed using one-parameter logistic item response model; estimates reported in Appendix D.
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Appendix B: question difficulty
Table B1: Question difficulty
a. Descriptive statistics of survey evaluation
Questions were... ... difficult ... clear ... thought-provoking ... interesting ... enjoyable
1. Certainly not 0.47 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02
2. 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.04
3. 0.17 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.32
4. 0.12 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.32
5. Certainly yes 0.05 0.48 0.17 0.28 0.30
N 3970 3970 3970 3970 3970
b. Ordered logit models of survey evaluationa
Questions were... ... difficult ... clear ... thought-provoking ... interesting ... enjoyable
Prob. questions 0.046 -0.072 -0.075 -0.108* -0.072
(0.062) (0.063) (0.059) (0.061) (0.0613)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3725 3725 3725 3725 3725
LLH -5044.67 -4138.71 -5499.29 -4818.51 -4740.34
Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at household level (2867 clusters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Notes
a Specification controls for gender, age, education, net HH income, HH type (single; partner no children;
partner with children; single with children; other), homeownership, urbanization and ethnicity (Dutch,
1st gen Western, 1st gen non-Western, 2nd gen Western, 2nd gen non-Western).
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Appendix C: linear models of actual vote with covariates
Table C1: Linear probability models of actual vote (0% or 100%) with covariates
a. Baseline (controls included in the models)
Parties
no vote VVD PVV CDA D66 GL SP PvdA other
Intention (%) 0.418*** 0.785*** 0.565*** 0.760*** 0.652*** 0.664*** 0.558*** 0.692*** 0.444***
(0.0326) (0.0251) (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0387) (0.0420) (0.0459) (0.0413) (0.0303)
Intention × prob. questions -0.0706 0.166*** 0.119** 0.159*** 0.207*** 0.222*** 0.232*** 0.157*** 0.275***
(0.0466) (0.0401) (0.0480) (0.0490) (0.0582) (0.0630) (0.0663) (0.0592) (0.0442)
Prob. questions -0.0183 -2.282** -0.850* -3.388*** -1.877** -2.043*** -2.034*** -1.982*** -2.097**
(0.574) (0.892) (0.483) (0.846) (0.790) (0.681) (0.734) (0.533) (0.827)
N 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732
R-squared 0.25 0.48 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.45 0.28
b. Probabilistic intentions replaced by mode (controls included in the models)
Parties
no vote VVD PVV CDA D66 GL SP PvdA other
Intention (%) 0.418*** 0.781*** 0.564*** 0.758*** 0.648*** 0.660*** 0.557*** 0.693*** 0.444***
(0.0326) (0.0251) (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0386) (0.0420) (0.0459) (0.0414) (0.0303)
Intention × prob. questions -0.0706 -0.0277 0.0394 -0.0111 -0.0134 0.0572 0.0637 -0.0104 0.154***
(0.0466) (0.0362) (0.0463) (0.0449) (0.0516) (0.0562) (0.0621) (0.0554) (0.0430)
Prob. questions -0.0183 -0.517 -0.165 -1.941** 0.544 -0.590 -0.675 -0.593 0.576
(0.574) (0.920) (0.470) (0.862) (0.787) (0.689) (0.736) (0.528) (0.831)
N 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732
R-squared 0.25 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.27
Specification controls for gender, age, education, net HH income, HH type (single; partner no children; partner with children; single
with children; other), homeownership, urbanization and ethnicity (Dutch, 1st gen Western, 1st gen non-Western, 2nd gen Western,
2nd gen non-Western).
Systems of linear probability models are estimated as SUR models (allowing for dependence between error terms of different equations).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level (2871 clusters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Appendix D: estimates of item response model for prob-
ability numeracy
Table D1: Estimates of item response model used to predict probability numeracy
a. Items ranked by increasing difficulty
Item Question
q1 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 100 would be expected to get the disease?
q2 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 1000 would be expected to get the disease?
q3 Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1%; 10%; 5%
q4 Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1 in 100; 1 in 1000; 1 in 10
q5 In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is your best guess
about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?
q6 If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a ... % chance of getting the disease.
q7 Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would
come up even (2, 4, or 6)?
q8 The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many of them are expected to get
infected?
q9 In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1000. What percent of tickets
of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? ... % of the tickets
b. Estimates of item response model
Item-specific parameters
Easy Difficult
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9
Discrimination 1.742***
(0.0501)
Difficulty -2.079*** -1.922*** -1.371*** -1.142*** -1.066*** -0.941*** -0.571*** -0.460*** -0.214***
(0.0788) (0.0723) (0.0535) (0.0501) (0.0485) (0.0481) (0.0427) (0.0418) (0.0409)
Individuals 2045
Log-likelihood -8111.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level (1589 clusters).
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Appendix E: linear models of probability numeracy
Table E1: OLS regression models of
probability numeracy
Probability numeracy
Actual vote (baseline: no vote)
VVD 0.782*** 0.356***
(0.122) (0.122)




























Cluster-robust standard errors in paren-
theses (921 and 885 HHs)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Notes
a Specification controls for gender, age, net
HH income, HH type (single; partner
no children; partner with children; single
with children; other), homeownership, ur-
banization and ethnicity (Dutch, 1st gen
Western, 1st gen non-Western, 2nd gen
Western, 2nd gen non-Western).
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Online appendix: simulation procedure for random pa-
rameters
We use the estimates of the mixed logit model in Table 4b to compute posterior means
conditional on reported choice expectations (intentions) and actual decisions. Therefore, we
carry estimation error from the mixed logit through in the linear models of posterior means.
We do this by drawing S = 5000 vectors of mixed logit coefficients from their asymptotic
distribution and computing posterior means for each of them. Denote the parameters of the
mixed logit model by θ and the individual-specific parameter for respondent n by βn. The
simulations proceed as follows (see Train, 2003, for details):











where wr = Pr(yn|xn,β
r)∑R
r=1 Pr(yn|xn,βr)
and βr|θ=θs is drawn from the mixing distribution at the
parameter vector θs. E.g. for the normal mixing distribution we draw βr|θ=θs from
N (µs, σs). We set R, the number of simulations in the inner loop, to 500.
Halton draws based on different primes are used to achieve variance reduction in both loops.
The values of β̌n|θ=θs for the S parameter vectors θs are draws from the sampling distribu-
tion of β̌n induced by the sampling distribution of θ̂. We summarize this estimation noise in
Table OA1, which contains descriptive statistics of individual-level parameters evaluated at
the mixed logit estimates, β̌n|θ=θ̂, and of the mean and standard deviation of β̌n|θ=θs across
simulation draws s. The mean sampling variability of the coefficient on intention is large
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Table OA1: Descriptives of individual-level parameters and their sampling distributions
(normal mixing distribution)
Simulated parametera Mean across drawsb SD across drawsc
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Intention 1936 0.030 0.0022 0.030 0.0035 0.0032 0.00082













































Figure OA1: Densities of random coefficient on intention × prob. quest. at
various percentiles of the mean coefficient
relative to the variation in coefficients across respondents. This can be seen by comparing
the SD of the mean coefficient across the sample (0.0035) with the mean across the sample of
the SD across simulation draws (0.0032). The interaction with the indicator for probabilistic
questions yields a sampling noise SD of 0.0039 and a cross-sample SD of 0.013. Though
this is a much better signal to noise ratio, it remains potentially important to incorporate
estimation error of the mixed logit parameters into subsequent inference.
Figure OA1 visualizes noise in the cross-sectional distribution of random coefficients on
the interaction by plotting their density for five different parameter vectors θs. In order to
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ensure that these densities adequately reflect sampling variation, we pick parameter vectors
based on percentiles of the cross-sectional average coefficient. The lightest line labeled “p5”,
for instance, corresponds to the first stage parameter vector θs that yields the 250th smallest
sample average coefficient out of the 5000 draws. The cross-sectional distributions all have a
similar shape with a heavy left tail. Their location shifts as we move through the distribution
of the mean coefficient, the magnitude of the difference between the peaks of p5 and p95 is
about 0.02.
The evidence presented above indicates that estimation error in posterior means is sub-
stantial relative to cross-sectional variation in their point estimates. However, lack of stability
of the cross-sectional distribution of β̌n|θ=θs does not imply that coefficients of linear models
that explain those coefficients will themselves be unstable. Estimating such models requires
one to take into account an additional source of variation. As long as we limit ourselves to
functions of β̌n, the only relevant uncertainty in our estimate β̌n is that which results from
the sampling error in θ̂. There is an additional source of noise to account for when we use
β̌n as dependent variable in a statistical model. Not only we do not observe our dependent
variable perfectly, but we should also factor in the usual estimation uncertainty from observ-
ing a random sample of respondents. We do this by taking a different bootstrap sample for
each draw β̌n|θ=θs and calculating the parameters of the second stage model from that com-
bination of β̌n|θ=θs and the bootstrap sample. The bootstrap is clustered at the household
level. For a given respondent n we capture estimation noise in the first stage by variation in
β̌n|θ=θs across θs. Different bootstrap samples contain different combinations of individuals
to approximate sampling error in the second stage model. We denote the S estimators of the
second stage parameters γ as γ̂|θ=θs .
Figure OA2 shows the density over bootstrap samples and θs of the coefficient on prob-
ability numeracy for the linear models reported in Table 6 of the main text. The densities
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Figure OA2: Density of coefficients on probability numeracy in second stage
linear model
linear model. Since all three sampling distributions are heavily skewed, we do not use any
normal approximations to compute p-values and confidence intervals. Instead, we calculate
these quantities directly from the simulation draws and report 95% confidence intervals rather
than standard errors in Table 6 of the main text.
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